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INTRODUCTION 
In 2019, the United States House of Representatives passed the 
Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act.1 The Act purports 
to safeguard the interests of consumers and employees by 
invalidating all predispute arbitration agreements and predispute 
joint-action waivers in the context of employment, consumer, 
antitrust, and civil rights disputes.2 The FAIR Act was sponsored 
almost exclusively by Democrats3 and was passed along mostly 
partisan lines.4 Although the bill was stalled in a Republican-
controlled Senate, the new Democrat majority will likely view it 
more favorably. President Biden has shown interest in banning at 
least some predispute arbitration agreements,5 so the bill’s fate will 
likely depend on its reception in committee and its proponents’ 
ability to circumvent the filibuster. 
The FAIR Act may be well intended, but a blanket ban on 
predispute arbitration agreements could bar access to efficient 
means of dispute resolution and unnecessarily bog down the 
traditional litigation system. Even accepting the prevailing 
criticisms of predispute arbitration agreements, a more moderate 
solution would likely be more palatable to differing ideologies, 
protect individuals6 from predatory corporate behavior, and allow 
parties to craft the dispute resolution process to suit their needs. 
This Note proposes such a solution in the form of an “opt-in” 
framework for enforcing arbitration agreements. Under this 
framework, predispute arbitration clauses would be enforced only 
if they were separately signed or clicked by the individual on an 
elective basis. 
 
 1. Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 2. Id. § 402(a). 
 3. Cosponsors: H.R. 1423—116th Congress (2019–2020), CONGRESS.GOV, https:// 
www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1423/cosponsors (last visited Mar. 
24, 2021). 
 4. 165 CONG. REC. 7,852 (2019). 
 5. The Biden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and 
Unions, BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/ (last visited Mar. 
24, 2021) (describing then-Candidate Biden’s plan to “ensure workers can have their day in 
court by ending mandatory arbitration clauses imposed by employers on workers”). 
 6. For purposes of this Note, the smaller parties to arbitration agreements (such as 
employees and consumers) will be referred to as “individuals” while larger parties (such as 
employers, banks, and consumer goods businesses) will generally be referred to 
as “companies.” 
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This Note first examines the rise and widespread adoption of 
arbitration in American law and commerce to illustrate why such 
clauses have become a focus of reform advocates. It will then 
consider some of the policy values behind arbitration law, as well 
as the benefits and disadvantages that might affect parties’ decision 
to arbitrate. Finally, it will propose, analyze, and respond to 
potential critiques of an “opt-in” framework as a preferable 
alternative to both the status quo and the blanket ban proposed by 
the FAIR Act. 
I. THE STATE OF ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 
To understand the firmly established position of arbitration in 
the United States, it is necessary to examine the history of the 
Federal Arbitration Act and its interpretation by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), enacted in 1925, made 
predispute arbitration agreements enforceable in the United 
States.7 In enacting this law, Congress was motivated at least partly 
by the widespread “agitation against the costliness and delays of 
litigation.”8 The FAA was also “designed ‘to overrule the 
judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to 
arbitrate’”9 by placing those agreements “upon the same footing as 
other contracts.”10 Section 2 of the FAA, which forms part of the 
“core” of its fifteen sections,11 provides the following: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an 
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,  
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
 
 7. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 
 8. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 2 (1924). 
 9. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 
(1989) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1985)). 
 10. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1 (1924). 
 11. Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or 
Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331, 335 (1996). 
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such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of  
any contract.12 
Section 1 clarifies that “commerce” refers to interstate and 
international commerce.13 It further limits the scope of the statute 
by clarifying that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts 
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class 
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”14 
The history surrounding the FAA’s enactment suggests that 
Congress may have intended it to apply primarily to disputes 
between experienced merchants.15 But even if this was the intent of 
the legislature, it failed to clearly incorporate that intent into the 
statutory text.16 Any attempt to construe the FAA as only applying 
to agreements between sophisticated commercial actors is thus 
bound to meet little success. 
The extent to which the FAA preempts state law is another 
question. The final clause of § 2, known as the “Savings Clause,”17 
exempts state contract law from preemption.18 Thus, courts must 
 
 12. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 13. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Shortly after the FAA was passed, Julius Cohen, one of its primary drafters, co-
authored a law review article emphasizing the exclusive utility of arbitration for esoteric 
commercial transactions: 
[Arbitration] is a remedy peculiarly suited to the disposition of the ordinary 
disputes between merchants as to questions of fact . . . . It has a place also in the 
determination of the simpler questions of law . . . which arise out of these daily 
relations between merchants . . . . It is not a proper remedy for what we may call 
casual questions—questions with which the arbitrators have no particular 
experience and which are better left to the determination of skilled judges with a 
background of legal experience and established systems of law. 
Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 
281 (1926) (emphasis added). This focus on transactions between merchants seems to be 
further supported by the testimony of the FAA’s proponents in congressional hearings. 
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. 
of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 6 (1924) (statement of Charles Bernheimer, 
Chairman, Committee on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York) 
(discussing the value of arbitration for businesspeople and merchants); see also Margaret L. 
Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge?, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 170 (2010) (discussing 
the historical use of arbitration as a means for businesspeople to seek adjudication through 
someone with greater industry expertise than a regular jurist). 
 16. The text of § 2 requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements connected to 
maritime transactions or those “involving commerce.” Although this language places 
emphasis on commercial bargains, it never explicitly limits itself to transactions between 
merchants or those parties with relatively equally bargaining power. 
 17. Brafford, supra note 11, at 336. 
 18. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
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apply state law to determine whether an arbitration agreement is 
enforceable and to resolve such questions as unconscionability and 
fraud in the inducement.19 But the text of the FAA does not state to 
what extent it preempts other state law.20 This issue has been the 
subject of evolving analysis by the United States Supreme Court, as 
will be discussed below.21 
B. Interpretation by American Courts 
1. Preemption by the FAA generally 
Since its enactment, the FAA has been the subject of a series of 
interpretive decisions by American courts which have gradually 
but dramatically expanded its scope to reflect a “national policy 
favoring arbitration.”22 At first, the FAA was treated as only 
applying to federal courts.23 But in a chain of cases24 culminating  
in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing, the  
Supreme Court characterized the FAA as substantive, rather than 
procedural law, and held that the FAA would replace state law in 
determining the enforceability of arbitration agreements in federal 
diversity cases.25 
Then the Court took the dramatic step of determining that the 
FAA applied to state courts so long as the contract involved 
interstate commerce.26 In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court stated 
that, “[i]n enacting § 2 . . . Congress . . . withdrew the power of  
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims  
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”27  
The Court further determined that “Congress intended to  
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability  
of arbitration agreements.”28 Thus, under the Constitution’s 
 
 19. Brafford, supra note 11, at 336. 
 20. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 21. See infra Section I.B. 
 22. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 23. Thomas Burch, Necessity Never Made a Good Bargain: When Consumer Arbitration 
Agreements Prohibit Class Relief, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1012 (2004). 
 24. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Guaranty Trust 
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 25. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967). 
 26. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10–11. 
 27. Id. at 10. 
 28. Id. at 16. 
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Supremacy Clause,29 state laws that conflicted with the FAA were 
implicitly preempted.30 
The Court continued extending its preemption jurisprudence 
when defining the phrase “involving commerce” in § 2.31 The Court 
had interpreted Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce 
extremely broadly,32 and in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the 
Supreme Court extended that reasoning to the FAA’s “involving 
commerce” language.33 This phrase, the Court reasoned, “normally 
signals Congress’ [sic] intent to exercise its Commerce Clause 
powers to the full.”34 Thus, although not every agreement might 
appear to involve interstate commerce, those with even a remotely 
commercial component fall under the FAA’s broad coverage.35 
The Court later held that any state-law requirement for 
arbitration agreements is valid only if it applies to contracts 
generally.36 In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the Court 
addressed a Montana law which required contracts containing 
arbitration provisions to provide notice “in underlined capital 
letters on the first page of the contract” that the agreement was 
“subject to arbitration.”37 The Court held that the FAA preempts 
state laws insofar as they place arbitration agreements in “a class 
apart” from other contracts.38 In other words, the Savings Clause of 
§ 2 does not exempt state laws that “singl[e] out arbitration 
 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 30. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (explaining that a state law is preempted when it “stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress”). 
 31. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 32. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (quoting United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)) (“The commerce power is not confined in 
its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities 
intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over 
it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the 
effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce.”). 
 33. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74 (1995). 
 34. Id. at 273 (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985)). 
 35. See id.; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124. 
 36. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996). 
 37. Id. at 683 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)). 
 38. Id. at 688. 
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provisions for suspect status.”39 Because the Montana law 
specifically targeted arbitration agreements with heightened notice 
requirements, the FAA overrode the state law and the arbitration 
provision was enforceable.40 
Consistent with this favorable stance toward arbitration, the 
Court has narrowly construed the § 1 exemption for employment 
contracts of “workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”41 
by determining that it only applies to transportation workers.42 
Employment arbitration agreements in virtually every other 
industry are therefore enforceable under the FAA. 
2. Class action waivers 
The Supreme Court has also liberally enforced waivers of the 
right to join in class actions found in many predispute arbitration 
agreements.43 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, consumers 
argued that the class arbitration waiver in their cell phone contract 
was unconscionable.44 In finding for the consumers, the Ninth 
Circuit had used generally applicable state contract law,45 which 
would seemingly be exempt from preemption under the FAA’s 
Savings Clause.46 Even so, the Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the Savings Clause does not “preserve state-law rules that 
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
objectives.”47 Because, among other things, class arbitration is 
“slower” and “more costly” than bilateral arbitration,48 it hindered 
the FAA’s objective of “facilitat[ing] streamlined proceedings” and 
was therefore preempted.49 
The Court resolved a similar issue in an employment context in 
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.50 There, employees argued that class 
action waivers violated their right under the National Labor 
 
 39. Id. at 682 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). 
 40. Id. at 687. 
 41. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 42. Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). 
 43. See infra Section II.G. 
 44. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337–38 (2011). 
 45. Id. at 338. 
 46. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Doctor’s Ass’ns., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996). 
 47. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343. 
 48. Id. at 348. 
 49. Id. at 344. 
 50. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
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Relations Act (NLRA) “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection.”51 The NLRA classifies it as an unfair labor practice “to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise” of this 
right.52 All the same, the Court held that this language does not 
show “a clear and manifest congressional command to displace the 
Arbitration Act.”53 Therefore, this landmark case established that 
class action waivers were fully enforceable in employment settings 
as well.54 
3. Adhesive contracts 
Arbitration provisions are often found in boilerplate contracts 
provided by businesses to consumers and employees. These 
contracts are adhesive, meaning that they are offered on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis in transactions with sizable disparities in 
bargaining power between the parties.55 Although these power 
disparities make adhesive predispute agreements susceptible to 
criticism, existing law provides little basis for invalidating them on 
that basis alone. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains 
that “[a] bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties 
to it are unequal in bargaining position, nor even because the 
inequality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party.”56 
Along with most of the cases already discussed, in which the 
relevant contracts were likely adhesive, the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected an argument to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement based on the mere risk of unequal bargaining power in 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.57 This decision was based on 
the absence of “the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power 
that would provide grounds ‘for the revocation of any contract.’”58 
So courts will generally enforce adhesive agreements unless there 
is a finding of actual coercion.59 
 
 51. Id. at 1625 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157). 
 52. 29 U.S.C. § 158. 
 53. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1624. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
 57. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). 
 58. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 627 (1985)). 
 59. Id. 
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In view of this long line of cases overwhelmingly favoring 
arbitration in the United States, any attempts to curb arbitration 
agreements based on interpretation of the FAA are likely to face 
insurmountable obstacles. 
C. Practical Impact of Arbitration Policy 
As a result of the consistently favorable approach that 
American courts have taken toward arbitration, the use of 
predispute agreements has steadily grown. The share of workers 
who have entered such agreements has doubled since the early 
2000s and now exceeds 55%, or around 60 million American 
employees.60 Companies with 1,000 or more employees use 
predispute arbitration agreements more often than other 
employers, as do low-wage workplaces and those with 
disproportionately large populations of women and African 
American workers.61 
These agreements are even more prevalent in consumer 
settings.62 A 2015 study by the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) found that 53% of outstanding credit card loans 
were attributed to issuers that used predispute arbitration 
agreements.63 For prepaid cards, which are usually used by  
lower-income individuals,64 more than 82.9% of the market 
required arbitration.65 It is likewise required by 85.7% of student 
loan contracts and 98.5% of the storefront payday loan market66—
both of which disproportionately affect low-income and minority 
 
 60. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION 1 (2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/144131.pdf. 
 61. Id. 
 62. KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE 
ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC 16 (2015), https://files.epi.org/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf. 
 63. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
§ 1028(A) § 2, at 7 (2015). 
 64. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 62, at 16. 
 65. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 63, § 2, at 7. 
 66. Id. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:6 (2021) 
1656 
demographics67—along with 99.9% of the mobile wireless market.68 
Considering both the widespread use of these agreements and the 
judiciary’s expansive interpretation of the FAA, it makes sense that 
reform efforts are being directed at the legislature. 
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION 
Next, it is useful to examine the considerations that might affect 
parties entering predispute arbitration agreements. Although such 
agreements tend to favor larger parties, they still present some 
potential advantages for individuals. A consumer or employee 
could therefore have enough incentives to consent rationally to 
arbitration under the right terms. 
A. Efficiency 
The arbitration process is generally much more streamlined 
than classic litigation.69 For instance, arbitration excludes such  
steps as motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, 
interrogatories, depositions, and appeals.70 Parties can contractually 
tailor the dispute resolution process by including or excluding 
steps according to their needs.71 The average arbitration process 
thus takes a little more than a year, while litigation sometimes  
lasts more than five years.72 This increased efficiency not only  
has positive implications for the parties themselves, but for the 
 
 67. See Judith Scott-Clayton & Jing Li, Black-White Disparity in Student Loan Debt More 
than Triples After Graduation, EVIDENCE SPEAKS REPS., Oct. 20, 2016, https:// 
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/es_20161020_scott-clayton_evidence_
speaks.pdf; S. ILAN GUEDJ, BATES WHITE ECON. CONSULTING, REPORT REVIEWING RESEARCH 
ON PAYDAY, VEHICLE TITLE, AND HIGH-COST INSTALLMENT LOANS 6–7 (2019), 
https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Report-reviewing-research-
on-payday-vehicle-title-and-high-cost-installment-loans.pdf. 
 68. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 63, § 2, at 7. 
 69. Seth E. Lipner, Is Arbitration Really Cheaper?, FORBES (July 14, 2009), https:// 
www.forbes.com/2009/07/14/lipner-arbitration-litigation-intelligent-investing-
cost.html. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See John S. Kiernan, Reducing the Cost and Increasing the Efficiency of Resolving 
Commercial Disputes, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 187, 210–11 (2018) (“Parties can further agree on 
rules that strictly constrain or eliminate expensive discovery, that substitute depositions with 
parties’ advance presentation of their witnesses’ direct testimony by written affidavit . . . , 
and that set strict timetables for written submissions and hearings . . . . The terms of the 
resulting ADR provisions . . . can be as customized and idiosyncratic as the parties’ 
imaginations and preferences may dictate.”). 
 72. Lipner, supra note 69. 
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judicial system more broadly. Arbitration diverts cases from 
already overwhelmed judicial dockets,73 thereby shortening wait 
times and directing disputes toward forums better suited for their 
procedural needs. 
B. Lower Costs 
On a similar note, arbitration is usually cheaper than 
litigation.74 Although taxpayers subsidize certain aspects of 
litigation,75 arbitration entails fewer “process costs” such as “forum 
fees, litigation expenses, out-of-pocket attorneys’ fees, time, and 
energy devoted by the parties.”76 Since arbitration offers less room 
for complexity than litigation does, process costs are often lower.77 
As with efficiency, this aspect of arbitration can benefit both 
parties. For a hypothetical construction dispute, one group of 
experts estimated that a claimant would incur 27% lower total costs 
in arbitration than in litigation.78 Of course, these numbers vary 
widely depending on the complexity and cost of a dispute,79 but 
arbitration is generally the more cost-effective alternative for 
both parties.80 
 
 73. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. CTS., https:// www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018; see also Dominick T. Gattuso, The 
U.S. District Court: Managing A Busy Docket, DEL. LAW., Summer 2013, at 8 (examining the 
caseload of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware). 
 74. Susan Zuckerman, Comparing Cost in Construction Arbitration & Litigation, 62 DISP. 
RESOL. J. 42 (2007) (comparing costs of arbitration and litigation in hypothetical 
construction dispute). 
 75. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) 
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 435–36 (2010) (“[T]he fact that a 
contract does not include an arbitration clause does not indicate that litigation is more 
efficient than arbitration, but only that parties prefer a subsidized dispute resolution process 
to an unsubsidized one.”). 
 76. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1247, 1267 (2009). 
 77. Id. at 1268. 
 78. Zuckerman, supra note 74, at 44. Mediation, on the other hand, would save ninety-two 
percent of the total costs of litigation. See id. 
 79. Id. at 48. 
 80. Lipner, supra note 70. 
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C. Confidentiality 
Arbitration is also generally confidential: there is no public 
record of the arbitration proceedings or of the ultimate settlement.81 
Additionally, contracts sometimes contain express provisions 
requiring parties to keep documents, awards, and even the names 
of the parties confidential.82 
This characteristic offers advantages to companies over 
individuals. By keeping arbitration proceedings behind closed 
doors, defendants can shield the subject matter of the dispute—
which is often unfavorable to the company—from the public eye. 
Granted, this privacy might sometimes be desirable for plaintiffs as 
well, especially in cases of sexual harassment or other matters that 
deal with delicate facts. But victims of discrimination, physical 
injury, or other harms must seek remedies without the publicity 
that might otherwise give them leverage in the dispute. 
Confidentiality also hinders other potential claimants from 
learning about the pending dispute.83 This ignorance, combined 
with the class action waivers typically found in predispute 
agreements, suppresses the likelihood that similar actions will be 
brought. More broadly, confidentiality also increases the likelihood 
of inconsistent outcomes because arbitrators cannot compare the 
facts to previously arbitrated cases.84 
D. Arbitrator Expertise 
In traditional state courts, judges have general jurisdiction, 
meaning that they might handle a divorce one day and an 
insurance dispute the next.85 Naturally, no jurist can develop 
knowledge in every subject area with as much depth as a specialist 
 
 81. Craig Smith & Eric V. Moyé, Outsourcing American Civil Justice: Mandatory 
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 297 (2012). 
 82. See Anjanette H. Raymond, Confidentiality in a Forum of Last Resort: Is the Use of 
Confidential Arbitration a Good Idea for Business and Society?, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 479, 495–
96 (2005). However, American courts do not always enforce such agreements in the presence 
of unequal bargaining power. Id. 
 83. See Smith & Moyé, supra note 81, at 297 (“[T]he secrecy of the arbitration 
proceedings leaves other parties injured by similar actions unaware of the availability 
of relief.”). 
 84. Id.; see also Raymond, supra note 82, at 502–03 (explaining the limited precedential 
value of arbitration decisions except in subsequent disputes between the same parties). 
 85. LEE HUGH GOODMAN, NICHOLS ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE WITH FORMS 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION HANDBOOK § 1:37 (2020). 
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might. Furthermore, out of concerns for due process, parties cannot 
select judges in these public forums.86 The arbitral forum, on the 
other hand, allows parties to select arbitrators based on their 
relevant subject-matter expertise.87 For instance, in a patent dispute 
over an electronic device, “the parties might want an arbitrator who 
has experience with intellectual property. The parties might be 
more interested in an arbitrator who is familiar with electronics, 
and might even want an arbitrator who has expertise in licensing 
electronic devices.”88 Subject-matter expertise is also particularly 
useful in construction and securities disputes.89 While specialized 
knowledge is not necessary in every case, it can enhance both the 
efficiency of the dispute’s resolution and the confidence of the 
parties in the outcome.90  
E. Potential for Bias 
On the other hand, there may be a higher risk of bias among 
third-party neutrals in an arbitration setting. Larger parties are 
often “repeat players” to the arbitration process. In other words, 
they arbitrate repeatedly and are therefore more familiar with both 
the forum and the arbitrators themselves.91 Such parties are 
statistically more likely to win disputes in arbitration than those 
who are one-shot users, and the remedies tend to be smaller.92  
For instance, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) released 
data from 2012–17 on employment cases against Macy’s, which 
represented nearly 47% of AAA’s employment arbitrations.93 While 
non-Macy’s cases had a 7.5% rate of dismissal, Macy’s cases  
had a 93% rate of dismissal.94 Similarly, awards from successful 
non-Macy’s claims averaged $328,000, while those against Macy’s 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Robert S. Brandt, Dispute Resolution Clauses in Contracts, 38 TENN. BAR J. 28,  
29 (2002). 
 90. See GOODMAN, supra note 85. 
 91. Smith & Moyé, supra note 81, at 298. 
 92. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 205–12 (1997). 
 93. Genie Harrison, Insight: Forced Arbitration is Bad News for Employees, California  
Stats Show, BLOOMBERG L. DAILY LAB. REP. (Aug. 15, 2019, 2:01 AM), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/insight-forced-arbitration-is-bad-news-for-
employees-california-stats-show. 
 94. Id. 
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averaged $87,000.95 Such outcomes may result partly from bias on 
the part of arbitrators. As Judge Michelle Friedland of the Ninth 
Circuit put it: 
By nature of the fact that arbitrators are hired and paid by the 
parties for whom they conduct private arbitrations, arbitrators 
have an economic stake in cultivating repeat customers for their 
services. In addition, arbitrators affiliated with an arbitration firm 
have an interest in not causing the firm to lose its top clients. At 
least to some extent, this means arbitrators have incentives to 
make decisions that are viewed favorably by parties who 
frequently engage in arbitrations. This feature of private 
arbitration, even if distressing, is an inevitable result of the 
structure of the industry.96 
No empirical study has conclusively attributed repeat-player 
outcomes to arbitrator bias rather than, say, the expertise of the 
advocates.97 Indeed, parties in classic litigation might also 
experience a home court advantage in courts where they regularly 
appear, but this isn’t necessarily the result of judicial bias.98 But 
there is intuitive appeal in the idea that, in the words of Justice 
Black, “it raises serious questions of due process to submit to an 
arbitrator an issue which will determine his compensation.”99 
F. Jury Trial Waivers 
Arbitration agreements also act as a waiver of one’s right to a 
jury trial. The Seventh Amendment of the United States 
Constitution states, “In suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved.”100 This amendment notably has not been 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1139 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(Friedland, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 97. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst 
the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 427–29 (2007). 
 98. Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, 23 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 68 (2017) (“[T]he repeat-player effect may be at least as prevalent 
in litigation as in arbitration. As Horton and Chandrasekher write, parties ‘who are regularly 
embroiled in litigation,’ have long exploited a ‘variety of ways’ to ‘capitalize on their 
experience to gain the upper hand over one-shotters.’ So litigation may have a ‘repeat-player 
effect’ that equals or even exceeds arbitration’s.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 99. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 416 (1967) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)). 
 100. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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incorporated to state courts,101 and it does not cover all litigation 
brought in federal courts—although some state law does grant 
additional protections of the right to a jury.102 But courts ordinarily 
view waivers of the right to a jury with some level of suspicion, and 
such waivers must satisfy high standards before they are 
enforced.103 In contrast, the Supreme Court has stated, “The 
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved 
in favor of arbitration . . . .”104 While some courts recognize the 
disparity in these two standards, most enforce jury trial waivers 
liberally as long as they are wrapped up in arbitration 
agreements.105 As a result, many individuals sign away the right to 
be heard by a jury of their peers without the level of knowing 
consent that would ordinarily be required.106 
G. Class Action Waivers 
Many arbitration agreements also prevent individuals from 
joining in class actions. Compared to individual litigation, class 
actions are much more cost effective for individuals because the 
costs of the action are spread over many claimants.107 For 
companies, on the other hand, class actions threaten massive costs 
because of the potential magnitude of the aggregated claims.108 
Corporate legal spending on class actions has steadily increased in 
 
 101. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (holding that 
the Seventh Amendment only applies to disputes brought in federal courts). 
 102. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669, 672–73 (2001). 
 103. Id. at 673 (“While jury trial rights under the Seventh Amendment are admittedly 
subject to waiver, waiver is tightly constrained by the following principles: (1) jury trial 
waivers may not be lightly implied; (2) courts look at a whole host of factors to determine 
whether the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intentional; (3) many courts provide that 
the party seeking waiver bears the burden of proof; (4) courts’ holdings render suspect the 
use of unsigned or uninitialed documents to support the finding of a jury trial waiver; (5) in 
interpreting purported jury trial waivers, courts have stated that they must be 
narrowly construed.”). 
 104. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). 
 105. Sternlight, supra note 102, at 711–16 (comparing the approaches taken by various 
jurisdictions in addressing this dichotomy). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Presentation at Comparative Perspective 
Conference at Geneva, Switzerland: An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United 
States 1 (July 21–22, 2000). 
 108. See id. 
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recent years. In 2018 alone, spending increased nearly 10% to $2.46 
billion.109 Almost half of that spending was on labor and 
employment or consumer fraud disputes.110 Preventing such 
actions is obviously an appealing prospect for businesses. 
According to the CFPB, over 90% of arbitration clauses in consumer 
financial contracts contained class actions waivers.111 As discussed 
in section I.B.2 above, the United States Supreme Court has treated 
such waivers as broadly enforceable.112 
Not only do these waivers increase the costs for potential class 
members, but in some cases they might decrease the likelihood that 
some actions will be brought at all.113 This is because many claims 
can only feasibly be pursued when aggregated among a large 
group of plaintiffs, since their monetary value is so small.114 Some 
critics therefore argue that class action waivers “undermine[] 
challenges to practices such as predatory lending and wage 
theft.”115 On the other hand, many disputes—particularly 
employment actions—are often too individualized to meet the 
commonality requirements for class formation and are thus 
inappropriate for collective action anyway.116 At any rate, this 
characteristic of many arbitration agreements seems to weigh much 
more heavily in favor of companies than individuals. 
H. Finality 
Unlike in traditional litigation, arbitration awards are 
immediately final because there is no classic right to an appeal.117 
Instead, the FAA provides some limited means for modifying, 
 
 109. CARLTON FIELDS, 2019 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY 7 (2019). 
 110. Id. at 11. 
 111. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 63, § 2, at 46. 
 112. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 113. See Smith & Moyé, supra note 81, at 297–98. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44960, 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 12 (2017). 
 116. Id. 
 117. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE ARBITRATOR ISSUES AN AWARD 2, 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA229_After_Award_
Issued.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2021). 
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correcting, or vacating an award in court.118 Common law has 
created some additional bases for courts refusing to enforce 
arbitration awards.119 The arbitration agreement itself can further 
call for “unrestricted” or “general” submissions, removing the 
obligation for the arbitrator to apply the law correctly at all.120 So 
while some avenues exist for resolving defects in arbitration 
awards, the standards are deferential and provide much more 
constricted options than the typical appeals process. 
The finality of arbitration can be an advantage for both parties, 
especially given the considerable time and expense required in the 
appeals process.121 Yet the finality of an arbitration decision can also 
present significant risks when the value of a dispute is high or 
where error on the part of the arbitrator is likely.122 When there is 
perceived arbitrator bias in favor of the larger party, the inability to 
appeal might seem particularly oppressive for individuals. To 
address these concerns, several major arbitration providers offer 
internal, extra-judicial appeals processes, but parties must elect to 
use these processes in the original arbitration agreement or in a 
post-dispute agreement.123 For those who do not, the same risks 
and benefits still exist.124 
Clearly, most of the above-referenced features of arbitration 
tend to favor companies. But these benefits are not exclusive—the 
efficiency, cost effectiveness, privacy, and specialization offered by 
 
 118. Section 11 allows modification or correction of an award in cases of miscalculation 
or mistake, awards made outside the scope of the matter, or imperfection in form. 9 U.S.C. 
§ 11. Section 10 states that an award may be vacated for such causes as corruption or 
misbehavior by the arbitrators, fraud, or the arbitrators exceeding their powers. Id. § 10. 
 119. These include an award being arbitrary and capricious, failing to draw its essence 
from the underlying contract, showing manifest disregard for the law, or being contrary to 
well-defined public policy. The Basics of Confirming, Vacating, Modifying, and Correcting an 
Arbitration Award Under the Federal Arbitration Act and the Texas Arbitration Act, FINDLAW 
(Mar. 26, 2008), https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/the-basics-of-confirming-
vacating-modifying-and-correcting-an.html. 
 120. Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & 
MEDIATION 56, 60–61 (2014) (“Unrestricted submissions give the arbitrator discretion 
whether to decide the case according to law or according to some other source of norms, 
such as the customs in the parties’ industry or the arbitrator’s own sense of equity.”). 
 121. See Joan C. Grafstein, Yes, You Can Appeal an Arbitration Award, LAW360 (Jan. 28, 
2015, 10:01 AM), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/grafstein_appeal-
arbitration-award_law360_2015-01-28.pdf. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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arbitration can often benefit individuals. Because these advantages 
can be shared, arbitration is sometimes desirable for both parties. 
III. VALUES UNDERLYING ARBITRATION REGULATION 
A. Autonomy and Voluntary Consent 
As some commentators suggest, party autonomy should be 
“the highest priority in the pantheon of arbitration values.”125 This 
idea is based on individual liberty and self-determination being 
fundamental values in organized democracy.126 Voluntary consent 
is an important corollary of this autonomy principle. That is, parties 
must enter contracts voluntarily, and personal autonomy is 
offended where one party seeks to impose the agreement at 
another’s expense.127 Instead, the parties must accept the 
terms bilaterally. 
But the practical application of these principles is a subject of 
dispute. Proponents of predispute arbitration agreements contend 
that autonomy is best preserved by enforcing customized 
arbitration agreements and with minimal regulation.128 Individuals 
should be free to enter transactions, to choose the terms of their 
agreements, and to waive their own rights as they wish. Similarly, 
they should reasonably be able to expect to have such agreements 
enforced against the other party. On the other hand, individuals 
who agree to mandatory arbitration rarely do so from such a 
theoretical position of autonomous decision-making. Rather, 
parties often enter transactions with significantly unbalanced 
bargaining power. When the alternative to accepting a predispute 
arbitration agreement is losing a job opportunity or being denied 
access to desirable—and sometimes indispensable—goods and 
services, personal autonomy might be constricted rather 
than enhanced.129 
 
 125. EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, 
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 5 (2006). 
 126. Id. at 4–5. 
 127. Id. at 6–7. 
 128. Id. at 5. 
 129. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and 
the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 48 (2005). 
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B. Economic Considerations 
Proponents of arbitration further contend that it lowers 
business costs, which, under competitive conditions, means that 
savings are passed on to consumers.130 These reduced costs could 
result from smaller jury awards, reduced adverse publicity, more 
streamlined procedural rules, fewer claims (especially class 
actions), limited discovery, or fewer appeals.131 The assumption 
that the savings from these advantages will be passed on to 
consumers is based on a principle of economics called the “rate-of-
return equalization principle.”132 That is, “whatever increases an 
industry’s profits ultimately attracts additional capital to that 
industry, causing an increase in that industry’s output and 
therefore a reduction in its price.”133 The reverse is also true: things 
that cut into an industry’s profits ultimately raise prices. 
Arbitration advocates thus argue that laws restricting arbitration 
work against the advantages described in Part II above and 
therefore drive up business costs and therefore prices 
for consumers.134 
That said, this argument has not been empirically supported. 
The CFPB study, for example, “did not find statistically significant 
empirical support for the theory that companies pass savings from 
their use of arbitration clauses onto consumers.”135 Opponents of 
arbitration further point out that savings are passed on to 
consumers only under conditions of perfect competition.136 This 
requires that there be so many small buyers and sellers that no 
single party can influence the market price, that the goods and 
services be homogenous, that market entry and exit be easy, and 
that there be free access to relevant information.137 Unless these 
conditions are met—which, in the world of predispute arbitration 
 
 130. Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer 
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 89–90 (2001) (emphasis omitted). 
 131. Id. at 90. 
 132. Id. at 91. 
 133. Id. at 92. 
 134. Id. at 93–99. 
 135. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 63, § 10, at 15. 
 136. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
75, 93 (2004). 
 137. Id. at 93–94 (citing WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES 
AND EXTENSIONS 401–02 (7th ed. 1998); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, 
MICROECONOMICS 252–53 (5th ed. 2001)). 
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agreements, is highly unlikely138—then companies will only 
partially pass the savings on to consumers. Moreover, these 
marginal savings are likely to be diffuse over a broad set of 
consumers while the negative ramifications are concentrated 
among those individuals bound by the agreements.139 Thus, the 
beneficiaries of these savings are much less likely to feel their effect 
than those bearing the costs. 
Another economic argument against mandatory arbitration is 
that confidentiality removes an important deterrent from 
committing bad acts. Although the threat of arbitration with its 
associated costs might itself do something to discourage this 
behavior, confidentiality protects the company’s behavior against 
broader scrutiny. As discussed previously,140 predispute agreements 
therefore insulate companies against the likelihood of similar 
litigation by other parties. Thus, in a consumer setting, companies 
lose incentives for providing quality goods and services, 
potentially imposing additional costs on consumers in the form of 
defects and decreased value. 
C. Individual Rights 
Even given these considerations, however, legislators must 
weigh economic value against other important concerns 
underlying regulation. Many regulations—such as those involving 
the manufacture of drugs, tires, and cars—increase costs for 
companies and sometimes prices for consumers, but factors like 
public health and safety counterbalance these costs.141 Legislation 
also requires businesses to employ ethical accounting practices.142 
Such regulation might impose higher costs on companies, but 
lawmakers have recognized that these costs are outweighed by the 
interest of the public in preventing unscrupulous corporate 
behavior.143 Similarly, preserving individuals’ right to a public 
forum might have sufficient intrinsic value to warrant special 
protection irrespective of economic considerations. 
 
 138. Id. at 94–95 (discussing how each element of perfect competition fails in most 
mandatory arbitration contexts). 
 139. See id. at 95–96 (discussing the “distributive aspects” of proponents’ economic argument). 
 140. See supra Section II.A. 
 141. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 136, at 95. 
 142. Id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)). 
 143. Id. 
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IV. MOVING TOWARD A MORE FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Opt-In Arbitration Clauses 
As an alternative to both the current system and the changes 
proposed in the FAIR Act, this Note proposes that Congress amend 
the FAA to enforce predispute arbitration agreements in consumer, 
employment, civil rights, and antitrust disputes only when the 
parties accept them on an opt-in basis. In other words, the law 
would invalidate any adhesive arbitration clause that must be 
signed as a condition of employment or obtaining a good or service. 
This requirement would extend not only to the contract itself, but 
also to the absence of any coercion or unfair manipulation by either 
party. Some individuals might understandably feel unspoken 
expectations—especially from employers—that fall short of 
outright coercion. But due to concerns of administrability, the 
individual should be able to point to some overt manifestation of 
pressure to void the agreement. 
Ideally, an enforceable agreement under this framework would 
be clearly distinguished from the rest of the contract to emphasize 
that the arbitration clause is optional. It would also contain an 
explanation of what rights—such as the right to a jury, the right to 
appeal, and the right to join a class action—the individual would 
waive by signing such a provision. Most importantly, the 
individual would have to independently sign or click the 
arbitration provision for it to be enforced as part of the contract. 
B. Precedent in Contract Law 
Precedent already exists in contract law for provisions which 
are valid only if independently accepted. For instance, Uniform 
Commercial Code § 2-209 deals with contracts providing that 
subsequent modification or rescission can be made only through  
a signed writing.144 It states that, when a merchant supplies a  
form containing such a provision to a non-merchant, the  
non-merchant must separately sign the modification requirement 
for it to be enforceable.145 The official comment to the UCC clarifies 
that this subsection exists to protect consumers.146 Another analog 
 
 144. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at cmt. 3 (“[I]f a consumer is to be held to such a clause on a form supplied by a 
merchant it must be separately signed”(emphasis added)). 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:6 (2021) 
1668 
exists in the form of contract addenda, which propose additional 
terms to be incorporated into a contract and are enforceable only if 
signed by both parties.147 Additionally, in a professional ethics 
context, a lawyer cannot require a client to prospectively waive 
malpractice liability unless they are independently represented by 
counsel in making the agreement.148 
C. Legislation Over Rulemaking 
George H. Friedman has proposed that such reforms be made 
to consumer financial contracts through rulemaking by the CFPB.149 
However, a broader legislative solution would be superior to this 
approach for two principal reasons. 
First, although the authority of the CFPB is expansive, it  
is tethered to regulating the provision of consumer financial 
products and services.150 But the concerns over mandatory 
arbitration clauses extend to employment agreements, as well as  
non-financial consumer contracts. Unlike an agency, Congress 
could cover this broader subject area without running afoul of its 
institutional limits. 
Second, agency rules are subject to greater volatility than 
legislation. Because the President exerts direct control over 
agencies,151 rules can be altered by smaller shifts in the political 
winds.152 Agency rules are also vulnerable to attack under the 
Congressional Review Act, whereunder Congress can invalidate  
a new rule using expedited procedures.153 An opt-in arbitration 
 
 147. Cf. Houston v. Willis, 24 So. 3d 412, 418 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (treating an 
addendum as an extension of an original contract). 
 148. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(h) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 149. See George H. Friedman, What’s a Regulator to Do? Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 
Dodd-Frank, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2014, 
at 6. 
 150. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). 
 151. This is true of the CFPB, especially now that the Supreme Court has deemed the 
removal protections for its single director to be unconstitutional. See Seila Law LLC v. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203–04 (2020). 
 152. To be sure, the Administrative Procedure Act does provide some restraints on the 
Executive’s discretion to change rules for policy reasons. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of 
U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–42 (1983). 
 153. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R3992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2020). Of course, this law would likely not see much action 
if the proposed rules were promulgated in 2021, given that President Biden would likely veto 
a joint resolution. 
1669 Opt-In Arbitration 
 1669 
reform could thus have greater scope and permanence if it were 
enacted through legislation, not CFPB rulemaking. 
D. Opt-Out Clauses Are Not Enough 
Some companies have sought to address concerns over 
mandatory arbitration by incorporating “opt-out” clauses into their 
contracts. Uber, for instance, uses such a provision in contracts with 
its drivers.154 The terms guarantee that the rest of the contract will 
still be valid if the driver exercises the opt-out clause, and that the 
company will not retaliate against a driver for doing so.155 But the 
process is cumbersome, requiring the driver to send a separate 
letter or email stating their name and intent to opt out within thirty 
days of signing the driver agreement.156 Similar provisions are also 
present in many credit card contracts.157 
The apparently voluntary nature of these provisions makes 
them appealing to courts.158 But while they might seem to protect 
voluntary consent, very few individuals read the terms of form 
agreements they sign, much less understand them.159 For example, 
the CFPB study found that, of credit card customers who were 
subject to predispute arbitration agreements, 18.4% were aware of 
those agreements160 and only 6.8% knew that they could not sue 
their credit card issuer in court.161 As for Uber’s arbitration 
agreement, an organized campaign has been necessary to facilitate 
many drivers’ exercise of their right to opt out and possibly even to 
inform them of the arbitration provision’s existence in the first 
 
 154. Technology Services Agreement, Uber Tech., Inc. (Dec. 11, 2015), https:// 
s3.amazonaws.com/uber-regulatory-documents/country/united_states/RASIER
%20Technology%20Services%20Agreement%20Decmeber%2010%202015.pdf. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Fred O. Williams & Caitlin Mims, Mandatory Arbitration: Most Credit Cards Allow a 
Way Out, CREDITCARDS.COM (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-
news/avoid-arbitration-study.php. 
 158. See, e.g., Larsen v. Citibank FSB, 871 F.3d 1295, 1313 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he 
existence of an opt-out provision strongly weighs against a finding of procedural 
unconscionability.”); Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2016) (similar). 
 159. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read 
the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014); see 
also Andrew Robertson, The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 179, 188 
(2005); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 233 (2002). 
 160. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 63, § 3, at 23. 
 161. Id. at 19. 
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place.162 The practical effect is that numerous individuals signing 
these contracts—perhaps most of them—are likely unaware of the 
opt-out option until a dispute arises. 
Granted, the “duty to read” is a well-established principle of 
contract law.163 That is, “failure to read an agreement before signing 
it does not render the agreement either invalid or unenforceable.”164 
This presumption has obvious practical necessity: it spares courts 
the odious task of line-drawing on the wide spectrum of 
understanding which parties may have of the contract terms. It also 
gives people greater confidence to enter transactions knowing that 
the other party will generally be held to a consistent standard 
of performance. 
Yet the problem with opt-out contracts does not lie in the duty 
to read itself, but in how the standard for consent allocates the 
effects of that duty. By default, an arbitration provision containing 
an opt-out clause is enforceable unless the opt-out clause is 
exercised. This standard of consent shields the arbitration provision 
behind the high probability that the details of the opt-out clause 
will not be read.165 Thus, opt-out clauses serve little more purpose 
than to satisfy courts that predispute arbitration agreements are not 
technically procedurally unconscionable. They do not mitigate the 
public policy concerns surrounding predispute arbitration 
agreements as they currently exist. 
On the other hand, mandating opt-in clauses would still respect 
the widely accepted duty to read. Consumer and employment 
contracts would be enforced, regardless of either party’s failure to 
read them before signing. But by requiring the opt-in clause to be 
separately clicked or signed, this higher standard of consent would 
make it less likely that the arbitration provision be enforced absent 
an affirmative decision to accept it. Thus, the ignorance of the less 
sophisticated parties would work in their favor—or at least not to 
their detriment. These contracts would be voluntary and protect 
 
 162. Don’t Let Uber Take Your Rights Away, RIDESHARE DRIVERS UNITED, 
https://drivers-united.org/uber-arbitration-opt-out (last visited Mar. 24, 2021). 
 163. Charles L. Knapp, Is There A “Duty to Read”?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1083 (2015). But see 
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they sign”). 
 164. Kibler v. Blue Knob Recreation, Inc., 184 A.3d 974, 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018). 
 165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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individuals’ interests far more effectively than deceptively similar 
opt-out clauses. 
E. Advantages Over a Blanket Prohibition 
An opt-in arrangement is likewise preferable to banning 
predispute arbitration agreements altogether for two principal 
reasons. On one hand, it respects the autonomy of contracting 
parties and ensures free selection of the dispute resolution forum. 
As arbitration law currently stands, most individuals signing  
these agreements are not truly autonomous. While they may be 
theoretically free to abstain from a transaction, they are functionally 
compelled—whether by the necessity of employment or of certain 
goods and services—to enter that transaction, and as a result they 
cannot refuse arbitration for a dispute arising from it.166 
The FAIR Act’s blanket prohibition on predispute arbitration 
agreements, on the other hand, would have an opposite but still 
undesirable effect. Individuals would never be able to enter 
arbitration agreements, even when such agreements would have 
desirable benefits like reduced costs. Of course, the bill does not 
forbid anyone from arbitrating.167 Rather, it invalidates arbitration 
agreements that are made at the predispute stage.168 In theory, 
parties would therefore be free to resort to arbitration once a 
dispute has arisen. But in practice this would likely never happen. 
Where a smaller party has a small or weak claim, the larger party 
would benefit from refusing arbitration and instead forcing their 
opponent to undergo the substantial costs and hurdles of litigation, 
thereby discouraging the action from being brought.169 In such 
instances, arbitration would be foreclosed to the smaller party, 
despite its potential advantages. 
Contrastingly, an opt-in arrangement would maximize 
personal autonomy where both alternatives fail. Parties would still 
be free to contract, to negotiate their own terms, and to waive their 
rights. But they would be permitted to do so without the threat of 
losing employment opportunities or access to important goods and 
services. And unlike the FAIR Act’s proposal, such an arrangement 
 
 166. See supra Section III.A. 
 167. Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. § 402(a) (2019). 
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would be minimally paternalistic. This is because, although it 
would alter the default bargaining context, it would not ultimately 
foreclose any course of action by either party since each can 
autonomously consent to either an arbitral or classic litigation 
forum. This flexibility would permit parties to tailor their dispute 
resolution process to their idiosyncratic needs. 
Second, enforcing predispute arbitration agreements on an  
opt-in basis would incentivize the company to sweeten the deal for 
the individual. If consumers, employees, and other small parties 
were on equal ground with larger parties to accept or reject 
predispute arbitration agreements, the larger parties would be 
pressed to craft the terms of their agreements to be more mutually 
palatable. For instance, they might offer to defray some or all of the 
costs of the arbitration process, to permit freer disclosure of 
information, to exempt certain types of claims from the arbitration 
requirements, to allow the smaller party greater input in the 
selection of the third-party neutral, or to allow class arbitration. 
Larger parties clearly have substantial benefits to gain from 
predispute arbitration agreements as they currently exist,170 and 
they could cede some of the benefits of the agreement without 
breaking even in their cost-benefit analysis. That said, this 
balancing phenomenon might be dampened if individuals continue 
to breeze past the terms without reading them. But nothing would 
prevent companies from placing their opt-in arbitration clauses 
prominently to attract attention when it is sufficiently important  
to them. 
Proponents of the FAIR Act might still argue that these ends can 
be achieved just as well by leaving arbitration-related negotiations 
for the post-dispute stage. After all, if arbitration is preferable to 
both parties, won’t they choose to arbitrate anyway? 
The answer is: not necessarily. . . . [T]he incentives to support 
arbitration change when the system becomes voluntary. . . . Once 
a dispute has arisen, each side will have a view about whether its 
claim will fare better in court or in arbitration. As a result, the 
parties are unlikely to agree, post-dispute, on a choice of forum. 171 
As another commentator put it, “[t]he comparative advantage 
of arbitration is that it enables both parties to enter into an 
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arrangement to manage some of the ex ante uncertainties about 
disputes before they arise.”172 For instance, the individual might 
exchange the likelihood of a higher recovery for easier access to the 
dispute forum, while the company might exchange the likelihood 
of prevailing for lower overall costs.173 The mutual value of such a 
tradeoff “is lost once the dispute arises and its terms are better 
known.”174 Thus, arbitration is likely not a viable option at all 
unless the parties agree to it before the dispute occurs.175 
CONCLUSION 
The FAIR Act deserves praise for its attempt to protect 
consumers and employees against predatory business practices. 
However, a more effective approach would allow parties to take 
advantage of the benefits of arbitration while ensuring that 
individuals can do so voluntarily. By implementing an opt-in 
standard for enforcement of arbitration agreements, the legislature 
could balance these priorities. Doing so would protect party 
interests more effectively than either existing arbitration law or a 
blanket ban on predispute arbitration agreements. 
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